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100			_aKang, Ki-Eun _954183
245			_aMake Me a Better Offer: _bDeveloper Threats and Regional Competition for Land Development Projects/ _cKi-Eun Kang
260			_bSage _c2020
300			_aVol.34, issue 1, 2020: (21–30p.)
520			_aTo extract favorable terms from local governments, developers can take advantage of intermunicipal competition and threaten to relocate or abandon a land development project. Some say that model of regional competition undercuts the economic, environmental, and societal benefits of development while others claim it boosts the efficiency of municipal operations. The authors examine the likelihood that land developers will push local governments to compete against each other for projects. Their study of New York municipalities (N = 306) finds that one third of local governments have been threatened and that one third of those reacted by reducing burdens or increasing incentives for developers. Their logistic regression model reveals that more cooperative intermunicipal relations across a region decrease the chances of developers threatening to move projects. Interestingly, the model suggests that public participation increases the chances of a threat.
650			_aLand Development Projects _954184
650			_aIntermunicipal competition _954185
650			_aThreats and Regional Competition _954186
700			_aHomsy, George C. _954187
773	0		_010589 _916747 _dSage Publisher _tEconomic development quarterly
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1177/0891242419897124
942			_2ddc _cART
999			_c13422 _d13422